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INTRODUCTION

It is fashionable these days to talk about the death of class
actions. The steps along the path to the cemetery are easy enough to
describe. In 1995, the Seventh Circuit significantly reined in the
emerging mass tort class action,2 and Congress imposed constricting
requirements on the securities-fraud class action.3 During the next
* Diane & M.O. Miller, II Research Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law
School. A version of this essay was delivered at a joint program of the Sections on
Litigation and Federal Courts at the AALS Annual Meeting. I thank the
participants in that program, as well as Mark McKenna, Rich Freer, and
participants in a faculty colloquium at Notre Dame Law School for helpful
comments on drafts of this article. I also thank Tony Carucci and Eric Hinz for
research assistance.
1. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Opting out ofLiability: The Forthcoming,NearTotal Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 375 (2005)
("[C]lass actions will soon be virtually extinct."); Myriam Gilles & Gary
Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v.
Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 627 (2012) (discussing "the coup de grace
administered to consumer class actions ... in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion");
Melissa Hart, Will Employment DiscriminationClass Actions Survive?, 37 AKRON
L. REV. 813, 813 (2004) (noting "the increasing skepticism-particularly among
members of the federal judiciary-toward the class action as an effective disputeresolution mechanism in the employment context").
2. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995)
(Posner, J.) (ordering that the district court decertify a class of persons with
hemophilia whose HIV infections had been caused by the defendants' tainted
blood products). Other circuits soon followed with comparable opinions. See,
e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996) (decertifying and
dismissing a class of tobacco smokers); In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069
(6th Cir. 1996) (ordering the decertification of a class of patients whose implanted
medical devices were allegedly defective).
3. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67,
§ 101, 109 Stat. 737, 737-49 (1995) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1,
78u-4 (2006)); see also Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub.
L. No. 105-353, § 101, 112 Stat. 3227, 3227-33 (1998) (codified as amended at 15
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four years, a pair of Supreme Court decisions took a jaundiced view
toward both mass tort and settlement class actions.4 The effect of
these developments-and of the judicial decisions that followed in
their wake-was to make multistate state-law class actions,5 as well
as positive-value class actions6 and class actions involving
significant individualized proof of causation or damages,7 very
difficult to maintain in federal court.
According to this story, the death spiral really kicked in when
Congress passed the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA),
which relaxed federal subject matter jurisdiction over state-law class
actions.9 That move swept more state-law class actions out of state
U.S.C. §§ 77p(b)-(d), 78bb(f) (2006)) (preempting many state-law fraud claims
brought on a class action basis when a federal securities-fraud remedy also exists).
4. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999) (holding that a
mandatory asbestos settlement class could not be certified under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(b)(1)(B)); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591
(1997) (holding that an asbestos settlement class could not be certified due to
defects under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a)(4) and (b)(3)).
5. See, e.g., Castano, 84 F.3d at 741-44 (arguing that class actions that
involve variations in state law may fail to meet Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance
requirement); id. at 747 (citing variations in state law as one reason that the class
action failed to meet Rule 23(b)(3)'s superiority requirement).
6. "Positive-value" or "large-stakes" class actions are class actions in which
the value of the claims of individual class members is large enough that they are
economically viable to pursue. They are distinguishable from "negative-value" or
"small-stakes" class actions, in which individual recoveries would be so small that
class members would not pursue them. The Supreme Court, as well as many lower
courts, has suggested that the argument for using class actions has particular
salience in the negative-value context. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 617 (noting that
Rule 23(b)(3) "does not exclude from certification cases in which individual
damages run high," but stating that such claims are not the core reason for using
class actions); Castano, 84 F.3d at 748 (arguing that small-stakes cases present
"[t]he most compelling rationale for finding superiority in a class action"); RhonePoulenc, 51 F.3d at 1299 ("In most class actions-and those the ones in which the
rationale for the procedure is most compelling-individual suits are infeasible
because the claim of each class member is tiny relative to the expense of
litigation.").
7. See, e.g., Lienhart v. Dryvit Sys. Inc., 255 F.3d 138, 147 (4th Cir. 2001)
(stating that "individualized proof of damages may defeat predominance where
proof of damages is essential to liability").
8. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
9. Among other things, CAFA employed a rule of minimum diversity and a
global amount-in-controversy requirement of more than $5 million-both of which
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courtsIo-especially state courts that had shown a willingness to
interpret their class action rules more loosely than federal courts had
interpreted Rule 23 after 1995.11

CAFA's effect has been magnified by three developments
subsequent to its passage. The first was Shady Grove v. Allstate
Insurance.12 Although the Court's fractured reasoning left the
opinion without a majority for a critical aspect of the case, the
expanded the number of class actions subject to federal jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d)(2) (2006); see THOMAS D. ROWE, JR ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 686-88
(3d ed. 2012) (comparing pre-CAFA and post-CAFA rules for subject matter
jurisdiction in class actions). In addition, CAFA relaxed a number of rules in order
to make removal of qualifying class actions from state court easier. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1453 (2006); see ROWE, JR. ET AL., supra, at 697-98 (discussing CAFA's
changes to removal provisions).
10. Some state-law class actions escape CAFA's gravitational pull. For
instance, a state-court class action may not meet CAFA's diversity or the amountin-controversy requirements. In addition, CAFA contains complex provisions
under which courts either may or must decline to exercise jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d)(3)-(4) (2006). Nonetheless, the effect of CAFA, at least initially, was
exactly what Congress intended: federal courts saw a significant uptick in the
number of class actions either filed in or removed to federal court. See EMERY G.
LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., IMPACT OF THE CLASS
ACTION FAIRNESS ACT ON THE FEDERAL COURTS: FOURTH INTERIM REPORT TO

THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES 1 (2008)
[hereinafter LEE & WILLGING, FOURTH INTERIM REPORT] (noting a seventy-two
percent increase in class action activity, after the passage of CAFA, in the eightyeight federal district courts studied). Cf EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E.
WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., IMPACT OF THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT ON
THE FEDERAL COURTS: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS FROM PHASE Two's PRE-CAFA
SAMPLE OF DIVERSITY CASES 2 (2008) [hereinafter LEE & WILLGING, PRELIMINARY
FINDINGS] (noting that, due to the limited judicial activity in the federal postCAFA class actions under study, "in diversity class actions, there is less to class
allegations than one would expect").
11. For a description of the generous state-court interpretations of state class
action rules laws and usages that motivated Congress to pass CAFA, see S. REP.
No. 109-14, at 11-27 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 12-27. The
Senate Report specifically noted that "[s]ome state courts with this permissive ['I
never met a class action I didn't like'] attitude have even certified classes that
federal courts had already found uncertifiable." Id. at 22, reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 23. For an examination of some of the differences between Rule
23 and state-law counterparts, see Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., State and Foreign ClassAction Rules and Statutes: Differences from-and Lessons for?-FederalRule 23,
35 W. ST. U. L. REV. 147 (2007).
12. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431
(2010).
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present upshot of Shady Grove is that federal courts are free to apply
Rule 23 (the federal class action rule) in diversity cases-even when
a state court in the state in which the federal court sat would apply a
less (or more) restrictive class action rule.1 3
The second development was Wal-Mart v. Dukes. 14 In WalMart, a bare majority of the Court interpreted the commonality
requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) narrowly,' 5 and a unanimous Court
construed the injunctive-relief requirement of Rule 23(b)(2)
narrowly.1 6 Along the way, the Court also settled-or at least
strongly intimated its views on-a number of other issues that had
been percolating in the lower courts: whether courts should engage
in a rigorous analysis of the merits of a claim when deciding class
certification (yes);' 7 whether class members must be afforded an optout ri ht whenever the class asserts claims for monetary relief
(yes);' and whether a court may use a trial-by-statistics approach to
ease potentially class-destroying difficulties of trying individual
claims for damages (no).19 For each of these questions, the Court
13. Justice Scalia's opinion enjoyed five votes for some portions, four votes
for others, and three votes for others. A majority of the Court agreed that Rule 23
conflicted with a more restrictive New York class action rule, thus squarely raising
the issue whether the federal court should choose Rule 23 or the New York rule.
Id. at 1437-42. The answer to that issue wound the Court through the language of
portions of the Rules Enabling Act, see 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006), with four
Justices upholding the use of Rule 23 under the Enabling Act by way of a broad
rationale that would almost always lead a federal court to apply Rule 23. Shady
Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442-47; see also id. at 1450-55 (Stevens, J., concurring)
(upholding the use of Rule 23 under a narrower rationale that might, in some cases,
require a federal court to adopt the state class action rule). Although she joined the
bulk of Justice Scalia's opinion, Justice Sotomayor declined to join one part of
Justice Scalia's opinion criticizing Justice Stevens' approach. Id. at 1444-47. The
four dissenters all joined an opinion written by Justice Ginsburg; they would have
held that the lack of a conflict between Rule 23 and the New York class action rule
required the federal court to adopt the New York rule to avoid the outcomedeterminative effects that would flow from choosing Rule 23. Id. at 1460-73.
Justice Stevens' departure from the Court leaves the effect of Shady Grove
somewhat up in the air.
14. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
15. Id. at 2550-57.
16. Id. at 2557-61.
17. Id. at 2551-52.
18. Id. at 2559.
19. Id. at 2561.
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settled on an interpretation of Rule 23 that constrained a potentially
broader use of class actions.
Third, the Court shut off the spigot for what was becoming a
burgeoning class action practice in arbitration. In Stolt-Nielsen v.
AnimalFeeds, the Court held that an arbitrator could not certify a
class action in arbitration against a party's wishes unless the
arbitration clause provided for class arbitration. 20 Then, in AT&T
Mobility v. Concepcion, the Court held that an arbitration clause in
which a company refused to consent to class arbitration with its
customers was enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act-even
though the small amount at stake made the customers' pursuit of
individual arbitration so unlikely that the arbitration clause was
unconscionable under state law.2 1
Despite these developments, to describe class actions as
either "dead" or in their death throes is to overstate the case. Many
class actions still proceed in state courts,2 2 and others are taken to
arbitration.23 Even federal courts still certify class actions with
20. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
21. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). Even
though the consumers' claim in Concepcion was classically a negative-value
claim, AT&T created certain incentives that might have induced some consumers
to pursue their individual claims. Id. at 1744-45. Whether these incentives were
significant in the Court's ruling remains to be seen.
22. See, e.g., In re Hannaford Bros. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 564
F.3d 75 (1st Cir. 2009) (remanding to state court a class action involving Florida
citizens suing a corporation headquartered in Florida but incorporated in Delaware,
even though related class actions were pending in federal court).
23. See, e.g., In re Craig, Case No. 74 115 Y 00419 11 (Am. Arbitration
Ass'n Nov. 30, 2011) (Zimmerman, Arb.) (preliminarily approving a $4.6 million
class settlement). Both of the major arbitration organizations in the United States,
the AAA and JAMS, have adopted rules for class action arbitrations. The AAA's
Supplementary Rules on Class Arbitrations were promulgated in 2003, and the
JAMS Class Action Procedures in 2009. Both sets of rules responded to the
holding in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003), in which
the Court held that an arbitrator, not a court, should determine whether the parties
to an arbitration clause contemplated the use of an arbitral class action. Although
the AAA and JAMS class action rules differ from each other to some degree
(notably, the JAMS Class Action Procedures allow certification of an arbitral class
actions on the grounds stated in Rules 23(b)(1) and (b)(2), not just that stated in
Rule 23(b)(3)), both mirror, in significant ways, protections that Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure affords class members in federal court. In
particular, both adopt the Rule 23(a) protections designed to ensure adequate
representation of absent class members.
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regularity.24 CAFA, along with the Supreme Court's Rule 23 and
arbitration cases, has woven a leash that bites deeply into their
throat, but class actions are definitely still breathing; and I see no
evidence that they are going to be choked to death any time soon.
The reason that the "death of class actions" trope remains
powerful, however, is its broad explanatory power. Four distinct
phenomena concerning class actions have been bubbling up at more
or less the same time: the expansion of federal subject matter
jurisdiction (CAFA), the tightening of Rule 23 (Amchem, Ortiz, and
Wal-Mart), the constriction on non-consensual arbitral class actions
(Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion), and a new riff on the age-old Rules
Enabling Act and Erie problem (Shady Grove). Each of the four
phenomena raises distinct issues and brings distinct intellectual
antecedents to the table; the Shady Grove problem, for instance, has
roots in separation-of-power and federalism issues far removed from
the particular workings of Federal Rule 23. 25 But there is an
understandable desire to find linkages among these events, at least in
part because they all concern class actions. As inaccurate as it may
be, the "death of class actions" provides a storyline that makes for a
compelling read-with some people rooting for the final demise and
others for resuscitation.
Even though it is less compelling, a fairer portrayal of recent
events is that federal courts exercise a greater gravitational pull on
class actions than they ever have-even if they are not (at least not
yet) the center of the class action universe. After CAFA, state courts
have a reduced role in adjudicating class actions; 26 after Stolt-Nielsen
and Concepcion, arbitrators are unlikely to handle many class
actions. 27 It is also fair to characterize the federal courts-and the
Supreme Court in particular-as being skeptical or even inhospitable

24. See, e.g., Young v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 693 F.3d 532 (6th Cir.
2012) (affirming certification of a class of insurance policyholders).
25. For the classic description of the constitutional and statutory issues at
play in this context, see John Hart Ely, The IrrepressibleMyth of Erie, 87 HARv.
L. REv. 693 (1974).
26. See LEE & WILLGING, FOURTH INTERIM REPORT, supra note 10 (noting
the increased role of federal courts in adjudicating class actions after CAFA).
27. Terry F. Moritz & Brandon J. Fitch, The Future of Consumer Arbitration
in Light of Stolt-Nielsen, 23 LoY. CONSUMER L. REv. 265, 270 (2011).
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to broad uses of the federal courts' class action authority.28 Mass
torts and other large-value cases, in which pre-existing arbitration
agreements are least likely, often fail to pass through the filters of
Rules 23(a) and (b). 29 Small-value cases like consumer claims,
antitrust cases, and even employment disputes may fall within the
terms of Rule 23; but they are increasingly subject to arbitration, thus
moving them into a system in which class-wide resolution is
unlikely. 30 Small-value securities-fraud class actions are often not
subject to arbitration and therefore remain in federal court, 3 1 but they
bear their own class action and substantive limitations. 32
The Supreme Court's circumscribing of class action practice
shows no sign of abating. In this past Term, the Court decided five
cases that, in combination, broadly construed CAFA's removal
jurisdiction, virtually sealed the fate of class arbitration, and
continued the narrowing of Rule 23. It is difficult to find another
28. See supra notes 2, 4-7, 14-19 and accompanying text; infra note 33 and
accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997)
(affirming denial of class certification and emphasizing that class treatment is
"ordinarily not appropriate" in mass tort cases "when individual stakes are high
and disparities among class members great").
30. See, e.g., Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500 (2012)
(employment); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747-53
(2011) (consumer); Stolt Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758
(2010) (antitrust).
31. See Barbara Black, Arbitration of Investors' Claims Against Issuers: An
Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2012, at 107,
107-18 (reviewing difficulties with the arbitration of securities-fraud claims
against issuers of securities).
32. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a), (b)(1)-(2) (2006)r (imposing heightened
standards for pleading and for conducting class litigation in securities-fraud
cases).; see also Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 32425 (2007) (discussing heightened pleading requirements in securities-fraud cases);
Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Filings: 2011 Year in Review 1
(undated), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouseresearch/2012
YIR/Cornerstone ResearchSecuritiesClassActionFilings_2012_MYR.pdf
(last visited Nov. 28, 2012) (noting that 188 securities-fraud cases had been filed
in 2011, slightly less than the average of 194 cases filed from 1997 to 2010 and
noting that ninety-four of these cases were class actions).
33. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013)
(holding that an arbitration clause requiring individual arbitration was enforceable
even though a class action was the only cost-effective way to enforce federal law);
Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013) (holding that an
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issue for which the Court has shown as much sustained appetite over
the past four or five years as delimiting the scope of class actions. 34
The merits of Congress's and the Court's handiwork can be
debated. Whatever the outcome of that debate, however, the present
state of affairs in American class action law is likely to continue for
some time because the unambitious and unflattering vision of class
actions that Congress set out in CAFA has become the regnant view
among legislative and judicial policymakers. Although this vision
can be criticized, present critiques fail to develop a role for American
class actions that is more compelling than CAFA's largely negative
portrayal. Until policymakers adopt a vision for class actions
different from CAFA's world of federalized, constrained class
actions, we are likely to continue along our present path. The

arbitrator did not exceed his powers in construing the parties' arbitration
agreement to permit class arbitration); Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426
(2013) (holding that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance
requirement when they did not show that damages were susceptible to class-wide
measurement); Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184
(2013) (holding that proof of materiality of alleged misrepresentations is not a
prerequisite to class certification in a securities-fraud action based on a fraud-onthe-market theory); Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345 (2013)
(holding that a plaintiff could not stipulate to less than the $5 million threshold
amount and bind absent class members by that stipulation).
34. In addition to Stolt-Nielsen, Shady Grove, Concepcion, and Wal-Mart, see
supra notes 11-20 and accompanying text, the Court has also decided two other
cases that resolved.issues of concern to class action practice during the past two
years. See Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368 (2011) (holding that, due to the
Anti-Injunction Act, a federal court cannot enjoin a state court from certifying a
class under the state's class action rule after the federal court declined to certify a
Rule 23 class involving the same conduct); Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton
Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011) (holding that securities-fraud plaintiffs do not need to
prove loss causation to obtain class certification under Rule 23). Although the
case is outside of the relevant period, the list could also include Exxon Mobil Corp.
v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005), which held that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(b) overturned the restrictive rule of subject matter jurisdiction forged in
Zahn v. InternationalPaper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973). Except in rare cases,
however, the even more capacious jurisdictional rules of CAFA, which was
enacted while Allapattah was pending in the Supreme Court, makes the
jurisdictional expansion of § 1367(b) a moot point. See JAY TIDMARSH & ROGER
H. TRANGSRUD, MODERN COMPLEX LITIGATION 331 (2d ed. 2010) (discussing the
limited circumstances in which § 1367(b) may provide federal subject matter
jurisdiction when CAFA does not).
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remainder of this Article develops this argument and suggests an
alternative vision that might set a new course for class actions.

II.

CAFA's

INFLUENCE ON CLASS ACTION DOCTRINE

By its terms, CAFA had two main effects.3 5 First, it
expanded federal jurisdiction over diversity class actions; its
minimal-diversity and aggregate amount-in-controversy approach to
original jurisdiction built a wider door for plaintiffs who want to
enter federal court.3 6 It also changed several long-standing rules on
removal jurisdiction to make removal easier for defendants in statecourt class actions in which plaintiffs prefer to be in state court.3 7
The second statutory change was to regulate federal class action
settlements, especially in-kind or coupon class actions in which class
members were typically compensated by discounts on future
products purchased from the defendant. 38
35. CAFA also had a third aim: it required the Judicial Conference of the
United States to study class action settlements and attorneys' fees, with an eye
toward creating recommendations to ensure fair limits on the fees of class counsel.
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 6, 119 Stat. 4, 13 (2006).
36. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2006) (granting district courts original
jurisdiction of any civil action brought as a class action in which any class member
is diverse from any defendant and the amount of controversy exceeds $5 million).
37. Under the usual jurisdictional rules, removal must occur within thirty
days after the case first becomes removable, and all defendants must join in the
removal notice. In addition, diversity-based cases cannot ordinarily be removed
more than one year after they are filed, nor can they be removed if the suit was
brought in the defendant's home state. Finally, the decision of a federal court to
remand a removed case is not ordinarily appealable, and the decision to deny
remand is appealable only after the case is over. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1292, 1441(a),
1441(b)(2), 1446(b)(2)(A), 1446(c)(1), 1447(d) (Supp. 2012). CAFA does not
change the thirty-day rule for seeking removal, but it changes the remaining
removal requirements to make removal of class actions easier: only one defendant
needs to request removal, there is no one-year limit on removal, defendants can
remove a case from a state court that is the home to one or more defendants, and
the court of appeals may accept an immediate appeal of a decision to remand (or to
deny remand). 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b)-(c) (2006).
38. CAFA pegged attorneys' fees to the actual value of the coupons used by
class members, not the potential value of the coupons on the assumption that every
class member would use them. See 28 U.S.C. § 1712(a). In addition, CAFA
required both notice to the relevant state or federal officials of the pendency of the
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But CAFA's influence on class actions was much broader
than these doctrinal changes.
In enacting CAFA, Congress
fashioned a comprehensive narrative about the nature of American
class actions: 39 Class actions were being abused, particularly in
certain state courts. Some state judges were running amok, with
plaintiffs' lawyers jerry-rigging the selection of class representatives
and defendants to eliminate diversity of citizenship (and hence, to
thwart removal). A single county judge might be asked to resolve a
ragtag collection of disparate claims from citizens of many states.
As class counsel knew, some of these judges enjoyed reputations for
using looser class action rules-or at least looser interpretations of
rules akin to Rule 23-to certify class actions that would never have
been certified in federal court. In the process, the state judges applied
local law to the claims of non-local class members, which frustrated
the policies and laws of other states. Once certified, these class
actions created the potential for catastrophic liability-a threat that
forced defendants to settle meritless claims at extortionate prices.
But plaintiffs rarely benefitted from these settlements. Class counsel
often agreed to coupon settlements or other arrangements-with
inflated potential value but little practical value to many class
members-in return for large fees that were calculated by using the
settlement and an opportunity for that official to provide input on the settlement
before its final approval. 28 U.S.C. § 1715 (2006).
39. I draw the following narrative from the opening pages of the Senate
Report on CAFA. See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 4-5, 20 (2005). In the context of
CAFA, reliance on legislative history is fraught with more than the usual
interpretive dangers. CAFA proceeded on such a fast track through Congress that
there was no House Report and the Senate Report was not finalized until February
28, 2005-ten days after President Bush had signed CAFA into law. See 1
WILLIAM H. MANz, THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005: A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY vii (2006) (providing a legislative chronology); Blockbuster, Inc. v.
Galeno, 472 F.3d 53, 58 (2d Cir. 2006) ("[T]he Senate Report was issued ten days
after the enactment of the CAFA statute"). On the other hand, a draft version of
the Senate Report was available before the Senate voted on CAFA. See Estate of
Pew v. Cardarelli, 527 F.3d 25, 32-33 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting "some skepticism as
to the 'probative value' of the Senate Report because it was issued after CAFA's
enactment (by ten days)" but still relying on the Senate Report, in part because
"the Report 'was submitted to the Senate on February 3, 200[5]-while that body
was [still] considering the bill."' (citing Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184,
1206 n.50 (11th Cir. 2007))). In any event, I am not proposing to use the
legislative history to interpret any provisions of CAFA, but only to describe the
narrative that impelled the legislation forward.
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inflated value. Competition among state-court class actions led to
inefficiencies and collusive behavior. Simply put, victims and
corporate defendants were losers in the class action world; the only
winners were class counsel.
This description of class action practice in state courts
provides, at best, a caricature of reality that is driven mostly by
anecdote and largely unsupported by data. 40 But it is important to
note that this negative story about class actions went only so far.
Although class actions may have been subject to abuse by
unscrupulous counsel or overreaching state judges, in small-stakes
cases they were also "a valuable tool in our jurisprudential system"
that were "beneficial when the class members are kept a priority
throughout the process."4 1 Abuse of class actions needed to be
controlled; left to run in their proper channels, however, class actions
did not merit the death penalty.
Given such a vision, CAFA's reforms made great sense. But
its doctrinal changes alone were insufficient. In addition, once a
class action was in federal court, Rule 23 would need to apply to the
case; otherwise, an unduly broad state class action rule would wreak
the same havoc (only in a federal forum). Rule 23 would need to
have its wings clipped. It could not be used in large-scale cases, and
even in small-stakes cases, it could not be construed in adventurous
ways that would replicate the problems found in state court.
Avenues other than state courts into which class actions might
escape-in particular, into arbitration, which the Supreme Court had
held just two years before CAFA's passage was a permissible forum
for resolving disputes on a class-wide basis42-needed to be cut off,
lest they become a new breeding ground for abusive practices.
Simply put, class actions belonged in federal court subject to tight
federal control.
40. See THOMAS E. WILLGING & SHANNON R. WHEATMAN, FED. JUDICIAL
CTR., ATTORNEY REPORTS ON THE IMPACT OF AMCHEM AND ORTIZ ON CHOICE OF
FEDERAL OR STATE FORUM IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 34, 38 (2004), available
at www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/amort02.pdf/ (compiling data on state and
federal class actions that were resolved before CAFA's passage; finding that "[i]n
both state and federal courts, cases were almost equally likely to be certified as
class actions" and that per-claimant recoveries in state court were lower).
41. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 4 (2005), reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 5; see
also supra note 6 (discussing the meaning of small-stakes class actions).
42. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
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The recent developments in class action practice that I have
described-Shady
Grove,
Wal-Mart,
Stolt-Nielsen,
and
Concepcion-are all essential components for implementing
CAFA's vision of a well-functioning class action system. To be
clear, I am not suggesting a cause-and-effect relationship between
CAFA's passage and these other developments.
Some
developments, like the reluctance to use class actions in large-stakes
cases, occurred before CAFA and helped to shape the Senate
Report's narrative. 4 3 Moreover, the doctrinal questions in each of
the post-CAFA cases that the Court decided were distinct and the
intellectual antecedents for each question were laid down far before
CAFA. The "procedural Erie" issue in Shady Grove is nearly as old
as Erie itself.4 Several of the issues resolved in Wal-Mart had been
kicked around since Supreme Court decisions in the 1970s and
1980s, 4 5 and Concepcion was the next chapter in the long-running
debate about the extent to which state law can undermine the broad
import of the Federal Arbitration Act. 46 Finally, there is little
evidence of cross-pollination among the cases. For instance, WalMart (the last of the Court's decisions) did not rely either on
CAFA's legislative history or on its earlier decisions in Shady
Grove, Stolt-Nielsen, and Concepcion. Similarly, in Shady Grove,
43. See supra note 6 (describing "large stakes" class actions).
44. Compare Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941) (applying Rule 35
even though an Indiana state court would arguably not have permitted a physical
examination in comparable circumstances), with Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v.
York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) (applying New York's statute of limitations rather than a
federal defense of laches to a state-law claim because federal courts should not
apply federal rules that might determine the outcome of a litigation).
45. Among the prior decisions that influenced the Court's decision in WalMart were Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974) (stating that a
court should not engage in a preliminary determination of the merits when
deciding whether to certify a class), General Telephone Co. of Southwest v.
Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155-60 (1982) (describing the proper approach to Rule
23(a) commonality), and Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812-13
(1986) (holding that providing class members with notice and an opt-out right
satisfies due process requirements). See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2550-57, 2552
n.6, 2559 (citing and discussing these cases).
46. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (stating that,
in passing the Federal Arbitration Act, "Congress declared a national policy
favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial
forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve
by arbitration.").
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the plurality refused to take account of the costs of applying Rule 23
despite state legislation specifically banning the class action at issue
in order to avoid these costs. 47 But in Stolt-Nielsen, decided just four
weeks later, the Court relied heavily on the costs of class actions as a
reason to require the consent of all parties as a prerequisite to class
arbitration.4 8
My claim is more modest-but also broader. In life and in
law, and especially in a system of common law reasoning, we look
for storylines that simultaneously explain observed events and
establish a path for future actions. 49 Although the reality of the
events is often more ragged than the theory that seeks to locate them
in a larger narrative, a good descriptive theory often becomes
normative: it selects certain propositions as the baseline for future
47. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431,
1443 (2010) (plurality opinion) (stating that Rule 23 may have "some practical
effect on the parties' rights," but it did not "alter[] the rights themselves, the
available remedies, or the rules of decision by which the court adjudicated either").
In his concurrence, Justice Stevens acknowledged these costs more forthrightly,
but did not believe that they required application of the state law barring class
actions under the facts of the case. Id. at 1459-60 (Stevens, J., concurring). In her
dissent, Justice Ginsburg raised the potential for a class action to skew the outcome
as a principal argument that Rule 23 was not intended to apply to the case. Id. at
1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that the application of Rule 23
"transform[s] a $500 case into a $5,000,000 award, although the State creating the
right to recover has proscribed this alchemy").
48. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1776
(2011) (describing the "fundamental changes" created by class arbitration, such as
adjudicating the rights of absent parties and increasing the size of the recovery). In
her dissent, Justice Ginsburg noted the irony that a plurality of the Court had just
argued in Shady Grove that class actions "'neither change plaintiffs' separate
entitlements to relief nor abridge defendants' rights; they alter only how the claims
are processed."' Id. at 1781-82 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Shady Grove,
130 S. Ct. at 1443 (plurality opinion)).
49. See, e.g., NATE SILVER, THE SIGNAL AND THE NOISE 12 (2012) ("We are

wired to detect patterns and to respond to opportunities and threats without much
hesitation.");

RONALD DwoRKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE

158-62 (1985)

(analogizing common law reasoning to a chain novel in which a later judge is
constrained in decision-making by the "chapters" of the story that prior judges
have written); Frederick Schauer, Precedent,39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 572-73 (1987)
("An argument from precedent seems at first to look backward. . . . But in an

equally if not more important way, an argument from precedent looks forward as
well, asking us to view today's decision as a precedent for tomorrow's
decisionmakers.").
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legal decisions. Thus, even if the Supreme Court did not consciously
press its doctrine into CAFA's mold, CAFA's essentially negative
portrait of class actions provides a narrative that makes sense of
recent developments in class action practice. This narrative may
begin to exercise an influence as the Court continues to work out the
proper role of class actions in the American litigation landscape. In
other words, CAFA's major influence may not be its doctrinal
effects on jurisdiction and settlement. On a range of issues beyond
federal jurisdiction and settlement, we are living in CAFA's world: a
world of wary and grudging acceptance of class actions in which
truly deserving class members can be rescued from the avarice of
counsel only through the vigorous exercise of federal oversight.

III.

CHALLENGING

CAFA's PARADIGM:

SOME FIRST EFFORTS

It is, of course, fair to contest CAFA's regnant narrative,
either by arguing that class actions should be restricted even more
than they are under CAFA's vision or by arguing that class actions
should be more widely available in state or federal court. In this
section, I examine three such criticisms. For reasons discussed
below, I am skeptical that any of the criticisms will have much effect
on changing CAFA's narrative or shaping class action policy in the
near term.
The first criticism is that, even as reined in by CAFA and the
other doctrinal developments, state and federal courts permit too
many class actions: class actions should never-or almost never-be
certified. A leading proponent of this theory is Professor Martin
Redish.o Under his view, class actions are inconsistent with liberal
democratic theory and are in most circumstances unconstitutional;
because class actions infringe on rights of autonomy and freedom of
association, the government can force class members into class
actions only by showing a compelling interest.5 1 In a few cases, such

50. For a capstone treatment of Professor Redish's many years of scholarship
on class actions, see MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE (2009).

51. Id. at 229-31.
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a compelling interest may exist; otherwise, no class actions should
be allowed. 52
An absolutist view against class actions is a coherent
intellectual position. Most legal systems around the globe have
never employed class actions or similar devices.5 3 The tide has
begun to turn in recent years, but a country with a strong regulatory
culture that prefers not to use private litigation to achieve public
regulatory goals might well look askance at American-style class
actions, 54 as would a system absolutely committed to individual
autonomy (although I know of no such system in the world today).
In the United States, which relies on private litigation to
augment its public regulatory responses, 55 the former objection to
class actions is not available. Nor is the latter: granting that
American procedure takes individual autonomy as far as any modern
56
legal system, it makes exceptions that deny some litigants their
"day in court." 57 Even Professor Redish-whose argument is as
52. Id. at 230-31. In boiling down a sophisticated analysis to a couple of
sentences, I have failed to capture the nuance of Professor Redish's argument. See
Jay Tidmarsh, Superiority as Unity, 107 Nw. U. L. REV. 565 (2013) (providing a
more detailed analysis of Professor Redish's positions).
53. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, Goldilocks and the Class Action, 126
HARV. L. REV. FORUM 56 (2012), available at http://www.harvardlawreview.org/
issues/126/december12/forum_984.php (noting that only "twenty-odd countries
outside the United States" have adopted class actions and that, among this number,
most have imposed significant limits on the mechanism).
54. See id. (discussing "vigorous debate in the European Union, where
advocates for private enforcement of antitrust and consumer protection law have
struggled against those who champion traditional European reliance on public
enforcement and deride proposals for 'American-style class actions."').
55. See Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public:
Representative Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 HARv. L. REV. 486, 489-91
(2012) (discussing both proponents and critics of this approach); Richard A.
Nagareda, Class Actions in the Administrative State: Kalven and Rosenfield
Revisited, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 603 (2008) (examining the interplay between class
actions and the administrative state).
56. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEX. L.
REv. 1665, 1672-76 (1998) (describing the American procedural approach as
"aberrant" and discussing differences between the legal systems of the United
States and other countries).
57. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892-95 (2008) (describing class
actions as one of six categories of exceptions to the "'deep-rooted historic tradition
that everyone should have his own day in court') (quoting Richards v. Jefferson
Cnty., 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996)).
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absolutist as any-admits that some class actions can be
maintained. 58 Therefore, although the "no class action" narrative is
coherent, it requires substantial change in the law-not the least of
which is the abolition of Rule 23 and comparable state counterparts.
Aside from its political infeasibility, the narrative suffers
from two other defects that probably doom it as a story worth telling.
First, as an absolutist position in a country that has never staked out
such an absolutist view, it fails a basic test of pragmatism. The view
that every lawsuit deserves individual attention-with lawyers, a
judge, and a jury dedicated to its resolution-may represent our ideal
of justice, but sensible people know that it is unachievable and
unrealistic in a large swath of cases, especially small-stakes disputes.
At some level, legal process is about cost and the efficient processing
of legal claims. 59 Although Congress was critical of expansive uses
of class actions, it recognized their benefits within boundaries. 60 To
take an absolutist position against class actions is either to reject the
notion that these benefits should matter-that a principle such as
autonomy is so inviolable that it must be vindicated, whatever the
cost-or to value this principle so highly that the countervailing
benefits of class actions never measure up. In a litigation-orientedas opposed to regulation-oriented-country such as the United
States, neither argument is compelling.
The second, and related, problem with this absolutist
criticism is that the values that class actions supposedly threatensuch as autonomy or the structure of the regulatory state-are
abstractions. They are arguments about the importance of process;
they are not result-oriented. A narrative that utterly ignores
outcomes is unlikely to resonate with policymakers. 6 1 All of us want
58. See REDISH, supra note 50, at 159-73, 231 (arguing that class actions
may be maintained when a defendant is facing the prospect of inconsistent
obligations arising from individual lawsuits and in negative-value cases, as long as
class members receive an opt-out right and certain other conditions are met).
59. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114
HARv. L. REv. 961, 1168 (2001) ("Most analysts ... recognize a need to trade off
the right to bring suit and legal costs.").
60. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 5-6 (2005).
61. On the floor of the Senate during the CAFA debate, Senator Boxer told a
series of stories about people who benefitted from class actions. She concluded by
saying: "[M]ake sure there is fairness for victims.... Do not close the courthouse
door to firefighters, moms and dads, who are working for justice in their lives."
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to know not only that the process is fair, but also that the process
leads to a fair result.62 In short, a narrative arguing that class actions
threaten our democratic way of life is unlikely to emerge as the
dominant storyline that replaces CAFA's narrative and shapes the
future of class actions.
A different group of critics approaches the problem from the
other side-they argue that Congress and the Court have given too
narrow a berth to state and federal class actions. The most tightly
focused of these criticisms is structural in nature: federalism.
Under this argument, state legislatures and courts should have a
broad say in shaping class action rules when state law provides the
substantive rule of decision.64 This position maintains that CAFA is
a step in the wrong direction; Shady Grove is incorrect; and
Concepcion strikes a faulty balance between federal interests in
enforcing arbitration and state interests in prohibiting
unconscionable contracts.
As an adequate story about the present and future shape of
American class action law, however, the federalism critique is
lacking. It focuses on process concerns instead of fair outcomes.
The federalism story is also incomplete; it has little to say about
Stolt-Nielsen (i.e., whether and under what circumstances arbitration
151 CONG. REc. 1552-53 (2005) (statement of Sen. Barbara Boxer); see also
Charles Silver & Lynn Baker, I Cut, You Choose: The Role of Plaintiffs' Counsel
in Allocating Settlement Proceeds, 84 VA. L. REv. 1465, 1539-40 (1998) ("[W]e
fear that absent plaintiffs' due process rights will be used to their detriment ...
denying them access to the benefits that make group litigation worthwhile.").
62. See generally AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 20-23, 208-17
(2009) (arguing that justice requires consideration of both the process by which an
outcome is reached and the outcome itself).
63. For two generally positive analyses of CAFA and the recent Court
decisions that involve, to some extent, consideration of federalism, see Richard A.
Nagareda, The Litigation-ArbitrationDivide Meets the Class Action, 86 NOTRE
DAME. L. REv. 1069, 1122-23, 1128-29 (2011) (finding connections among the
Court's Erie jurisprudence, its arbitration decisions, and CAFA); John C. Massaro,
The Emerging FederalClass Action Brand, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 645, 666 (2011)
(arguing that these cases, as well as other developments in class action law,
represent a nationalization trend that "is a girder in an overall structure designed to
protect individual participatory rights"); see also Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine
M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization,53 UCLA L. REv. 1353 (2006) (providing
an analysis that evaluates CAFA and establishes a federalism framework through
which the Court's more recent cases can be evaluated).
64. Massaro, supra note 63, at 657-59.
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should be hospitable to class-wide claims). More significantly, the
federalism critique says nothing about the breadth of Rule 23 for
cases that are properly in federal court. Indeed, some of those who
level the federalism critique do so to point out the irony that the
politicians and Justices who have presided over the nationalization of
class action practice were members of or were appointed by a
political party that nominally supports states' rights-not because the
critics themselves believe strongly in federalism or a constrained use
of Rule 23. 65 A federalism story may help to determine who should
be making decisions about the breadth of American class actions, but
it says almost nothing about what that breadth of class actions should
be.
A second way to critique and make sense of the emerging
law of class actions is to see the disparate threads as attempts to
regulate access to justice. By "justice" I do not mean a fair
determination of contested legal rights by a court. Rather, I use
justice to refer to any process that commences with aggrieved
persons laying their complaints of legal wrongdoing before a neutral
party.
In terms of access to justice, individual judicial
determinations of legal right are the gold standard-the form of
access to justice that, in a world without costs, society would ideally
make available to all. But cases individually litigated to judgment
are costly,66 and society cannot afford to provide this level of dispute
resolution for each individual claim.67 Every society regulates
65. See Linda Mullenix, FederalClass Actions: A Near-DeathExperience in
a Shady Grove, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 448, 451-52 (2011) (recounting some of
the odd political bedfellows in the Shady Grove litigation); Mark P. Gaber,
Maintaining Uniform Federal Rules: Why the Shady Grove Plurality Was Right,
44 AKRON L. REv. 979, 995-97 (2011) (noting the ironic relationship between
CAFA and Shady Grove while defending the result in Shady Grove).
66. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.1 (7th
ed. 2007) (discussing the costs of litigation); Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and
Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of
Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 58-59 (1982) (discussing the likelihood of an
individual plaintiff bringing suit under different systems of allocating costs).
67. The commitment of legal resources required to provide individual
adjudication of claims would be substantial. Only about 10% of people with
viable tort claims seek a lawyer's assistance. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore
Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 119, 135-36 (2002)
(estimating that only 11.2% of perceived litigable claims resulted in filing a
lawsuit); Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the
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access to courts-most significantly by requiring parties to bear a
significant portion of the expense of dispute resolution, 68 but also by
imposing gatekeeping rules that limit the claims that can be pursued
to judgment. 69
Arguably, one of the revolutions in American legal thought
during the twentieth century was the belief in open access to courts
for all litigants. 70 The same period saw a concentration of power in
governmental and private institutions with the ability to cause broad
harm, an expansion of substantive law more likely to hold such
defendants accountable, and a cultural willingness to challenge
them.7 1 This constellation of events led to the perception, if not
always the reality, that courts could hear all claims. By the end of
Tort Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1149, 1183-89 (1992)
(reporting on studies showing that the rates for seeking legal assistance and filing
tort and other claims is ten percent or less). Even among cases that enter court,
many end up settling without an adjudication of rights-although estimating the
percentage of cases that settle is a difficult business. See STEVEN SHAVELL,
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 281 (2004) (citing studies
showing that over 96 percent of civil cases were settled without trial); Theodore
Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What is the Settlement Rate and Why Should We
Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 132 (2009) (finding an aggregate
settlement rate of 66.9 percent of civil cases in two federal district courts); Kevin
M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, supra,at 136 (estimating a settlement rate to
be at least 66.7 percent in federal civil cases terminated in 2000).
68. One of the principal expenses is attorneys' fees, which one or the other of
the private litigants typically bears regardless of whether a jurisdiction employs the
American rule or the "loser pays" rule.
69. Among the doctrines employed in American federal courts are standing,
mootness, ripeness, and some of the Rule 12(b) defenses.
See ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION §§ 2.1-.6 (5th ed. 2007) (discussing
justiciability limits on federal jurisdiction); RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE
§§ 6.2, 7.1-.3, 12.6.1 (2d ed. 2009) (discussing certain Rule 12(b) motions).
Courts can also limit access to courts by narrowly construing the substantive law.
See Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 54
("[N]o judge is likely to decree more than he thinks he has the power to
accomplish.").
70. See Judith Resnik, Comment, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on
AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 78, 88 (2011) ("[T]he development of egalitarian norms during the twentieth
century transformed the obligations of courts in democracies.").
71. See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Authority in the Dock, 69 B.U. L.
REV. 469 (1989) (discussing the increased cultural acceptance of using litigation to
challenge traditional modes of authority).
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the century, however, the difficulties and costs of realizing that ideal
became evident. Not surprisingly, therefore, a central question for
the American legal system in the twenty-first century will be the
extent to which we allow wide-scale access to courts, as opposed to
allocating claims to other dispute-resolution processes or to none. 72
At a fairly high level of generality, CAFA and the Supreme
Court's cases can be bundled under an "access to justice" rubric. Of
course, CAFA and Shady Grove fit into an "access to justice" story
only weakly. CAFA is less about access to justice per se than about
creating access to federal courts for cases that already enjoyed access
to state courts. Likewise, Shady Grove's outcome provided alleged
victims in small-stakes litigation access to courts when they would
have been unlikely to enforce their rights in individual litigation. But
as Wal-Mart showed, Shady Grove's holding-that Rule 23 applies
in federal court regardless of the content of the state class action
rule-could equally work to restrict access to courts when Rule 23 is
narrowly constrained.
Of course, described at a high level of generality, many of the
Court's cases, such as its recent forays into pleading 74 and summary
judgment, involve questions of access to justice. The problem with
an "access to justice" narrative is that it is less of a conclusion than it
is a question. Congress and the Court have set about defining the
boundaries of access to the courts and to the class action device. Is
the access too little? Too much? To stitch CAFA and the Court's
cases into a narrative, there must be a sense of how much access to
the judicial system is proper. Once that baseline narrative of a
properly functioning dispute-resolution system is told, then it is
possible to evaluate CAFA and the Court's class action decisions.
72. See Resnik, supra note 70, at 170 ("AT&T, Wal-Mart, and Turner
comprise the agenda for the twenty-first century, during which decisions will be
made about what courts are for, who pays the price for process, and what remains
of relevance in the phrase 'equal justice under law."').
73. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2548 (2011)
(applying Rule 23 to deny employees' Title VII claim).
74. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009) (requiring
that a plaintiff plead a plausible claim in the complaint); Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554-58 (2007) (outlining the requirements of a plausible
claim sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss).
75. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 386 (2007) (holding that summary
judgment was proper in a civil rights case).
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Put differently, critics may attack CAFA or the Court by arguing that
more access to justice is necessary, but that critique does not answer
how much access is appropriate. Are class actions, which few would
76
argue are the ideal form for accessing justice, a part of the solution
to "access to justice" concerns or part of the problem? Is a secondclass form of access to which significant costs attach better than
none? CAFA's narrative provides an answer of sorts to these
concerns; it sets out a baseline of individual justice-whether in
court or in alternative dispute resolution-that is reluctantly
compromised in multistate small-stakes cases as long as justice
demands cohesive class-wide treatment and a federal judge is
available to protect victims from the rapacity of their own counsel.
Simply attacking CAFA and the Court's class action jurisprudence
for failing to provide access to justice is too negative. Instead, a
contrast to the CAFA narrative that extols a positive vision of the
role of class actions in the delivery of justice is needed.
Such storylines exist. For instance, there is the old, preCAFA story that class actions are necessary to ensure full
enforcement of the law and to achieve full deterrence of
wrongdoing.78 In his recent critique of the present state of class
action law, Robert Klonoff has attempted to revive this story,
suitably burnished to counteract CAFA's generally negative
portrayal of class actions. 79
76. But see David Rosenberg, ClassActions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual
Justice by Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561, 567 (1987) ("[B]ureaucratic justice
implemented through class actions provides better opportunities for achieving
individual justice than does the tort system's private law, disaggregative
processes.").
77. See Alexandra D. Lahav, Due Process and the Future of Class Actions,
44 Loy. U. CHI. L. J. 545, 549 (2012) (discussing tradition as an argument "driving
a preference for individual litigation").
78. See Rosenberg, supra note 76, at 562-67; David Rosenberg, MandatoryLitigation Class Actions: The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 831, 832 (2002) ("Ex ante, everyone .

.

. understands that for mass tort

liability to achieve optimal deterrence and insurance, individuals must act
collectively....").
79. See Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abst
ract id=2038985 (arguing that courts have cut back sharply on the ability to bring
class actions during recent years, undermining the compensation, deterrence, and
efficiency functions of the class action device).
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This story has resonance. The class action device, when used
responsibly by capable counsel under the watchful eye of the court,
provides a powerful remedy for achieving mass justice. For smallclaim cases, it provides the only vehicle for recovery, absent a public
enforcement action. The threat of a class action also provides
deterrence against wrongdoing. For wrongdoing that inflicts harm
sufficient to warrant individual lawsuits, a class action avoids the
need to resolve the common issues over and over. In adjudicating
class action issues, courts should return to basic principles and not
lose sight of the fact that the class action can be a useful and efficient
device. And they should not allow an abstract concern about
blackmail settlements or the possibility of abuse by class counsel to
raise the overall bar for certification.
This story goes a long way toward changing the course of
class action law. It establishes a vision of class actions as a useful,
and in some cases the only, way to resolve disputes. This narrative
also assures the reader that rapacious counsel will be kept under
control. In the end, however, it comes up short as a competing
narrative that might displace CAFA's story for five related reasons.
First, it fails to address adequately the deep-seated objection to all
class actions: that individual control of legal claims is preferable.
Granting that class actions can be useful, at what point must their
utility give way to the demands of individual control? This vision
fails to answer that question. Second, the vision remains vague on
exactly how class counsel's purported greed is to be kept in check.
Third, it fails to speak about the outcome that class members can
expect from the class action; it speaks of enforcement and
deterrence, and to some extent of recovery-but never states that the
recovery is a fair one. Fourth, it fails to specify the respective roles
that state and federal courts-as well as state class action rules and
Rule 23-should play in the development of class action practice.
Finally, Dean Klonoff's narrative is in one regard too
positive. Class actions have costs; it is feckless to pretend that they
do not (nor do I suggest that Dean Klonoff is unaware of these
costs).80 These costs raise a fundamental question: even if class

80. Indeed, Dean Klonoff is a coauthor of a significant casebook on the
subject of class actions, as well as an associate reporter on the American Law
Institute's recently completed study of aggregate litigation. ROBERT H. KLONOFF
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actions provide enforcement and deterrence, is the class action game
worth the candle? One of the brilliant aspects in the construction of
CAFA's narrative is its apparent pragmatism-its willingness to give
credit where credit is due, and to stake out the places where the
benefits of class actions sufficiently outweigh their costs to make
them worthwhile. As Dean Klonoff's vision suggests, CAFA may
give too little credit to the capacity of class actions to achieve
beneficial results for class members. 81 But his vision does not
demarcate those areas in which class actions should be used from
those areas in which they should not.
Unless it solves these problems, the old "class action as a
useful enforcement tool" narrative is unlikely to unseat, or even
compete seriously, with CAFA's vision for the role of class actions
in American law. We will continue to live in CAFA's world.

IV.

A WAY FORWARD: TREATING SUPERIORITY SERIOUSLY

Consider, instead, the following vision for class actions: A
class action should be available if, and only if, it yields greater net
social utility than any other litigation or arbitration form. If multiple
class actions meet this criterion of superiority, the class action that
yields the greatest net social utility-the optimal class actionshould be used, and other class actions should not be permitted to
proceed. Every class member is guaranteed representation that will
at every moment yield a net expected value that equals or exceeds
the recovery that the class member would have received in individual
litigation. Any recovery that the class members receive will be
spread equitably within the class. The fees for class counsel are
structured to align counsel's incentives with maximizing the class's
recovery.
Such a vision presents a clear way forward for class actions.
The point is not simply that the class action is a useful tool for
enforcing rights; rather, the class action is used only when it is the
ET AL., CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER MULTI-PARTY LITIGATION (2d ed. 2006);
L. INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION iv (2010).

AM.

81. See Klonoff, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 17
(discussing the adoption of CAFA as "not without foundation," but adding that it
was passed on the basis of "exaggerated concerns").
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best tool-after taking into consideration all the costs and benefits of
the class action and its alternatives. Most of us, I expect, would
enjoy living in a legal world that employed class actions in this
fashion. At a minimum, if it were possible to construct class action
doctrine along these lines, this approach would give the CAFA
approach to class action doctrine a serious run for its money.
Indeed, this "superiority narrative" has clear advantages over
other narratives that have tried to compete with CAFA in recent
years. First, the narrative focuses on outcome more than on process.
Under this vision for class actions, society as a whole ends up better
off from their use. As for the individual class members, they can
expect to end up no worse off, and at least some will end up better
off, when compared to a world in which they controlled their own
claims. Put differently, the class representatives and class counsel
will conduct the representation to "do no harm" to their individual
interests. Second, CAFA's parade of horribles is avoided. Should
the class action yield a recovery, class members will share in the
recovery equitably. Meanwhile, CAFA's bogeyman-the greedy
class counsel who takes all the spoils and leaves nothing for the class
members-is banished. Third, this narrative provides an answer to
the "how much access to justice" question. Courts are a social
resource, and a government is within its rights to insist that litigants
access the judicial system through the most efficient forms. 82
Therefore, we employ class actions when they are more socially
beneficial than other forms for resolving a dispute, provided that the
class action does no harm to each individual class member's
interests. When they fail to provide such benefits, individuals are
still able to pursue other available forms of redress.
82. 1recognize this statement may be controversial. Some scholars argue that
access to justice is an individual right. See, e.g., Alan Boyle, Human Rights and
the Environment: Where Next?, 23 EuR. J. INT'L L. 613, 621-23 (2012) (noting the
"long-established human right of access to justice," as evidenced by the Aarhus
Convention, decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, and academic
writing); Francesco Francioni, The Rights of Access to Justice Under Customary
International Law 1, in ACCESS TO JUSTICE AS A HUMAN RIGHT (Francesco
Francioni ed., 2007) (arguing that access to justice is a part of customary
international law). My argument is not necessarily to the contrary; rather, my
point is that a government can provide different forms of access to its courts.
Further, it can limit or deny access to some forms when other forms are more
efficient.
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Of course, the devil is in the details of this vision. Over the
past few years, I have assayed pieces of this vision, suggesting how
superiority, optimality, and "do no harm" adequate representation
should play into a class action rule, and how they might be roughly
achieved through the use of certain presumptions. 83 Rather than
repeating or engaging in a lengthy development of these points here,
I briefly examine a few of the points of convergence and divergence
between this vision for the role of class actions in American life and
CAFA's vision.
First, both CAFA's narrative and the superiority narrative
recognize necessary limits on the scope of class actions. The
principal difference between them is where the class action boundary
lies. The basic and most important boundary under the superiority
narrative is simple: use class actions when they are more socially
useful than alternatives; do not use them when they are not. 84 The
view of class actions that emerges from CAFA and the Supreme
Court's cases-not to use class actions in large-stakes litigation and
to interpret narrowly the various provisions of Rule 23 (a)(2) and
(b)(2) in Wal-Mart,ss (a)(4) and (b)(3) in Amchem, 86 and (b)(1)(B) in
Ortiz87 -iS more confused. Although the sum total of the decisions
shows the Court's lack of interest in construing Rule 23 broadly,8 8
83. See Tidmarsh, supra note 52 (discussing superiority); David Betson &
Jay Tidmarsh, Optimal Class Size, Opt-Out Rights, and "Indivisible" Remedies, 79
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 542 (2011) (discussing optimality in small-stakes class
actions); Jay Tidmarsh, Rethinking Adequacy of Representation, 87 TEX. L. REV.
1137 (2009) (discussing "do no harm" adequacy of representation); see also Linda
Sandstrom Simard & Jay Tidmarsh, Foreign Citizens in Transnational Class
Actions, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 87, 123-28 (2011) (discussing the more general
question of using presumptions to help implement superiority insights in the
context of transnational litigation). For an attempt to assemble these components
into an overarching class action rule that also adds in providing proper incentives
to class counsel, see JAY TIDMARSH, CLASS ACTIONS: FIVE PRINCIPLES TO
PROMOTE FAIRNESS AND EFFICIENCY (forthcoming LexisNexis 2014) (on file with

author).
84. See Tidmarsh, supra note 52, at 567 (discussing "the idea that class
actions should be used only when they advance social welfare").
85. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2550-53 (2011).
86. Amchem Prods., Inc.. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 622-28 (1997).
87. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 831-37 (1999).
88. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly stated that it does not want to construe
Rule 23 in adventuresome ways in light of the command of the Rules Enabling
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006). Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2561; Ortiz, 527 U.S. at
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they have no overarching theme that suggests either the reason or the
limiting principle behind the Court's concerns. In my judgment,
Amchem, Ortiz, and Wal-Mart were rightly decided; there was too
much disunity among class members' claims to view the class action
as presumptively superior.89 But my approach does not rule out the
possibility of large-stakes class actions as categorically as CAFA's
vision and the Court's decisions do.
Second, a vision that begins with the use of class actions
when they are superior and optimally sized argues for broad federal
jurisdiction. The reason is the fear of a race to the bottom: lawyers
who find themselves shut out of the optimally-sized class action have
an incentive to undercut this class action by creating a new class in a
different court and proposing to settle the case on better terms (for
the defendant and the lawyer, not the class members) than the
defendant could obtain in the optimal class action. Such "reverse
auctions" are a recognized concern in the class action literature. 90
One way to prevent the race to the bottom, and thus to ensure that
class counsel have an incentive to form optimal class actions, is to
make it easier for all potential competing class actions to be
concentrated in a single forum. 9 1 In this regard, state courts have
significant disadvantages, principally because they lack powerful
inter-jurisdictional transfer mechanisms akin to the federal courts'
multidistrict-litigation authority. 92 Indeed, in terms of ensuring
845; Amchem, 521 U.S. at 612. These holdings are in modest tension with Shady
Grove, in which the Court held that the Enabling Act did not preclude the
application of Rule 23 to a case in which the state-court rules specifically
prohibited class actions in circumstances in which Rule 23 permitted them. Shady
Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1472 (2010).
89. See Tidmarsh, supra note 52, at 587-88 (discussing the relationship
between the disunity of claims and a finding of superiority).
90. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class
Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1370-73 (1995) (discussing the idea of reverse
auctions). For one situation in which a reverse auction may have occurred, see
Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 126 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 1997), opinion withdrawn and
superceded by 179 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1999).
91. Cf In re Discover Card Payment Prot. Plan Mktg. & Sales Practices
Litig., 764 F. Supp. 2d 1341 (J.P.M.L. 2011) (ordering multidistrict transfer of
actions in part because the litigation involved "four overlapping class actions, three
of which are brought on behalf of putative nationwide classes").
92. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006) (creating the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation and providing it with the power to transfer related cases for pretrial
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optimal class actions, CAFA is not generous enough, even if it is a
large step in the right direction.
Third, and relatedly, the superiority narrative admittedly fares
less well than CAFA's narrative with respect to federalism concerns.
The superiority narrative presents an argument for how a class action
rule should be structured to maximize social benefit without causing
individual harm, at least in terms of expected outcome. It does not
focus on process or structural concerns, except to the extent that they
can be included as costs that must be accounted for in the net-socialbenefit calculus. Although a superiority-based class action rule
should recommend itself to rulemakers at both the state and the
federal level, they may disagree-or at least they may sort out the
costs and benefits differently.
Something along those lines may have occurred in Shady
Grove, in which New York's legislature made a judgment that class
actions were too problematic to use for claims asserting a right to
statutory penalties in excess of actual damages. 93 I happen to believe
that Shady Grove was correct, but for Erie-based reasons unrelated
to the superiority narrative. 94 Viewed only through the lens of this
narrative, Shady Grove is a more difficult case. As I have said, class
actions should typically be lodged in federal court to ensure
optimality. As a general matter, applying a single class action rule
(Rule 23) to these cases gives the federal court a better chance to
shape a superior, optimally sized class action than applying a
multitude of class action rules to various class members. If it can
indeed be shown that a state legislature forbade class actions
precisely because it believed that the costs of the class action
outweighed its benefits for certain claims, the federal court can
purposes to a single federal court). A comparable power giving state courts the
ability to transfer cases among themselves has been proposed. See Uniform
Transfer of Litigation Act, 14 U.L.A. 661 (2005) (allowing courts in one state to
transfer a proceeding to another consenting state that also has jurisdiction after a
weighing of relevant factors). At present, however, no state legislature has enacted
the proposal. See Transfer of Litigation Act, Enactment Status Map, UNIFORM
at
available
4:43
pm),
26,
2013,
COMM'N
(Feb.
LAW
(last
http://uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Transfer%20of%20Litigation%20Act
visited Jan. 23, 2013).
93. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1440.
94. For an analysis of my reasons, see Jay Tidmarsh, Procedure, Substance,
and Erie, 64 VAND. L. REV. 877 (2011).
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account for that fact in conducting its superiority analysis and deny
class certification for those claims.95
Finally, the superiority narrative is more agnostic about class
action arbitration than the Court has been. It may be that, in given
circumstances, class arbitration will be better than a class action
brought in court. It may even be that individual arbitration leads to
greater social benefits than a class action, whether brought in court
or in arbitration. In both instances, the superiority principle requires
that a court defer to the arbitration alternative. But the opposite
could also be true, and the class action alternative could be superior
from a social perspective. The Court's recent decisions that lie at the
intersection of class actions and arbitration-Stolt-Nielsen and
Concepcion-are insufficiently attuned to the superiority question.
From the viewpoint of the superiority narrative, both cases raise a
difficult question: whether we as a society should allow parties to
contract out of the dispute-resolution form that is, by definition,
socially superior and relegate them to the, by definition, inferior
arbitration process to which they have agreed. Because neither Rule
23, the arbitration panel's class action rule in Stolt-Nielsen, nor the
California state-court class action rule in Concepcion are presently
construed to ensure that superior-and only superior-class actions
are certified, the cases did not squarely present this question. But the
superiority narrative's answer to the question is clear: use the class
95. This argument is roughly consonant with the argument that Justice
Stevens made in his concurrence in Shady Grove. See Shady Grove, 131 S. Ct. at
1457 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that Rule 23 should apply in diversity cases
unless the state's class action rule was designed to affect "the scope of statecreated rights and remedies"). The difference between my view and Justice
Stevens is that, as a matter of the Rules Enabling Act, I believe that Rule 23
applies in federal court; but in determining whether to certify a specific state-law
class action as being superior under Rule 23, a court should consider legislative
determinations about the costs of using class actions to enforce "state-created
rights and remedies" in rendering its superiority analysis. Cf Ratner v. Chem.
Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (denying class
certification in a statutory-penalty case because using a class action to enforce the
rights at stake would lead to such overwhelming liability that the class action
failed to meet the superiority prong of Rule 23(b)(3)); but see Bateman v. Am.
Multi-Cinema, Inc., 623 F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating that a trial judge
improperly found a lack of superiority because the liability in a statutory-damages
case was disproportional to the actual harm suffered); Murray v. GMAC Mortg.
Corp., 434 F.3d 948, 952-54 (7th Cir. 2006) (same).
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action if it yields a greater social benefit without jeopardizing the
expected recovery that individual litigation would yield.
At some point, respect for individual autonomy to enter
voluntary transactions provides a limit on the superiority narrative.
When parties of equal bargaining power voluntarily and
consensually waive a class action remedy in favor of individual
arbitration, judges may prefer to give effect to the agreement despite
the social loss involved. Whether that same result should pertain in
contracts of adhesion found in consumer settings like Concepcion
presents a harder issue.

V.

CONCLUSION

Pushed to its limit, respect for individual autonomy requires
the abolition of all class actions other than ovt-in arrangements in
which class members voluntarily join together. 6 This outcome may
satisfy absolutist opponents of class actions, but it is not consistent
with either CAFA's stated narrative or the superiority narrative.
Finding the right balance between social utility and individual
autonomy is a constant problem in law. Unlike CAFA's narrative,
the superiority narrative focuses directly on this fundamental matter.
If we are to chart a different course for class actions than the one
upon which CAFA has set us, we must recapture the sense that class
actions are sometimes superior to their alternatives, and then
dedicate ourselves to ensuring that we use class actions only when in
fact they are.

96. As originally enacted in 1938, Rule 23(a)(3) contained a "spurious class
action" provision that was in effect an opt-in rule. See 7A CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1752 (3d ed. 2005)
(showing that the original Rule 23(a)(3) was often used as a mechanism for the
permissive joinder of interested parties). In addition, the Fair Labor Standards Act
contains a "collective action" provision that likewise is an opt-in provision. See 29
U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006) (stating that "[n]o employee shall be a party plaintiff to any
such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party . . . .");
Symczyk v. Genesis HealthCare Corp., 656 F.3d 189, 192 (3d Cir. 2011)
(discussing the history and use of collective actions under § 216(b)), rev'd on other
grounds, 133 S. Ct. 1523 (2013)).

